如何驾驭第七波的全球化——魏尚进对话杰弗里·萨克斯

导语

当今最紧迫的问题基本上是全球性的。如果我们要确保长远的未来，就需要采取一致的全球行动。

“当前，我们已经进入人类历史上第七波的全球化。全球化的治理需要改革，才能战胜全球各种紧迫与严峻的挑战。人类能否经受住这波挑战，可以从以往六波全球化的经历中获得启示。”这是国际著名经济学家、可持续发展问题研究专家杰弗里·萨克斯（Jeffrey D. Sachs）教授在他最新力作《全球化时代：地理、技术与制度》（The Ages of Globalization: Geography, Technology, and Institutions）一书中表达的观点。通过对世界历史的思考和解读，杰弗里·萨克斯教授试图阐明21世纪人类社会面临的挑战和机遇及我们可行的应对之道。

近日，《复旦金融评论》主编、哥伦比亚大学终身讲席教授魏尚进与杰弗里·萨克斯教授展开对话，就“第七波全球化”下各国的竞争与合作展开深刻研讨。

萨克斯教授回顾了七次不同的全球性技术和制度变革浪潮，从早期现代人类通过长距离迁移实现最初定居开始追溯，一路探讨至当下对全球化的反思。在此过程中，他思考了地理、技术与制度的交互作用如何影响新石器时代的革命；马匹在帝国崛起中的作用；大型帝国在古典时代的扩张；从欧洲通往亚洲和美洲的海路发现后，全球帝国的崛起和工业时代的开启。杰弗里·萨克斯教授表示，这些过去的浪潮为我们当前所处的时代中正在发生的进程提供了新的视角——基于数字技术的全球化。他强调必须采取新的国际治理与合作方法，以防止冲突并实现与可持续发展相一致的经济、社会和环境目标。

他认为，以前的每个时代都出现了新的治理形式，我们现在也亟需一种新的全球治理形式来克服当今世界的三大挑战：第一，由于新技术取代工人而导致的、日益严重的收入和财富的不平等，即全球范围内持续存在的极端贫困，以及富裕社会内部不平等的加剧；第二，人为导致的“违反地球边界”的气候变化，使生物多样性丧失和污染加剧；第三，全球战争的威胁以及因为战争可能造成的物种灭绝。

萨克斯教授通过对人类历史的反思，帮助我们获得迫切需要的理论来理解全球化时代的人类发展，同时也为我们的未来发展提供了重要指导。

S: Shangjin Wei（魏尚进）

J: Jeffrey Sachs（杰弗里·萨克斯）

相比竞争，世界更需要合作

S: Your book takes a very long view of the history of globalization. One of the things that I came across in your book, when I was reading it, was that, sometimes the history can be violent, people do terrible things to each other and technology sometimes exacerbates that. But at the same time, people can also collaborate. And technology can also help on that dimension as well. So, in terms of lessons from the history, what do you think are the productive ways for us to manage the current wave of globalization? 

魏尚进：《全球化时代：地理、技术与制度》一书从宏观的角度审视了全球化的历史。当我在阅读这本书时领会到的一点是：有时历史是暴力的，人们可以对彼此做可怕的事情，而科学技术可以变成暴力的助虐；但同时历史上也不乏人们相互合作的事例，技术也可以帮助人们更好地合作。您认为为了有效地应对第七波全球化浪潮中的挑战，我们应该从前六次全球化浪潮中吸取哪些教训？

J: As you say, each wave of globalization has tended to change geopolitics, because new technologies or new institutions give rise to power. And power typically gives rise to war, unfortunately, in history. Once a country becomes powerful, it seems that the urge for conquest becomes also very, very powerful. And we see that with Britain, for example, which has a great economic success, which turns into a global empire. And I see it with the United States after World War Two, when the US became really the world’s superpower. You can't really run the world by an army. It's not possible. It's not desirable. It's not economical. So, it doesn't really accomplish much, but there is a lot of arrogance of power. So, for me, the question is, can we gain perspective, especially can scholars, cultural figures, business people or people in their daily lives be more constructive so that we don't fall into the tendency of viewing others through power relations, but rather through cooperation.

杰弗里·萨克斯：正如您所说，每一次全球化浪潮都有可能改变地缘政治，因为新技术或新制度产生了权力，而权力通常会引发战争。不幸的是，历史上一旦一个国家变得强大，其征服他国的冲动似乎也变得非常强烈。例如，我们看到英国在获得了巨大的经济发展之后，摇身一变成为一个全球性的帝国。同样的剧情也发生在第二次世界大战结束后的美国。但是纯靠一支军队来管理世界是不可能、不可取，也是不经济的。这么做不会达到什么好结果，只会反映权力的傲慢。所以每当（全球）权力发生变化的时候，我们都要警惕。我觉得我们要反思的是，学者、文化名人、商界人士以及老百姓需要反思的是，能否多从如何合作的角度来看（国与国之间的）关系， 而不是什么都从权力斗争的角度去思考。

The truth in history is that it has happened both ways. And after World War Two, one very bright development was the invention of the United Nations by Franklin Roosevelt. He was our greatest president. He really wanted to create an institutional framework for global peace. And so, his idea during World War Two was that there should be a United Nations, and with the five major powers,  or the five permanent members of the security council of that new United Nations. Actually, if those countries would work together to solve the pandemic, to address climate change, or to address other issues, we would actually have the basis for solving a lot. But if we view these challenges as cooperative opportunities, there is so much that could be done together. If we view them as rivalries, there is so much danger to the current situation. So, I'm very uneasy about where we are today because the institutions of the UN are not that strong. The United States actually has stopped supporting them, even pulling out of the World Health Organization. The chances for misunderstandings are very great. And so, I think this is the time to emphasize the cooperative possibilities.

历史上正反经验教训都有。第二次世界大战结束后，富兰克林·罗斯福发起成立的联合国，这是一个引人注目的发展成果。罗斯福是我们美国最伟大的总统，他确实想为世界和平建立一个制度框架。所以，他在第二次世界大战期间的想法是应该建立一个联合国，由五个主要大国担任五个常任理事国。实际上，如果这些国家能够共同努力解决全球大流行病、气候变化等问题，就可以做成很多事情。现在也应该有更多国家加入常任理事国。如果我们将人类遇到的挑战视为合作的机会，就可以一起做很多事情；如果我们把它们看作是又一个竞争，就会给目前的局势就带来许多危险。我对我们今天的处境感到非常不安，因为联合国的机制并不是那么强大，实际上美国已经停止了对它的支持，也退出了世界卫生组织。这一切变化让（国与国之间的）误解的可能性增大。所以，我认为现在应该是强调合作的时候了。

S: Jeff, in your book, you made the reference to Graham Allison’s book, which proposed this Thucydides Trap hypothesis. It claims that whenever there's a change of power leadership, or whenever two leading powers get close in size, the chance of a war is much higher than 50%. In your reading of history, do you find it a useful description about power transitions? A related question is whether the United Nations can help us avoid the Thucydides Trap if it does exist. In the previous six waves of globalization, we did not have the United Nations (to try to stop wars between countries). Now we do. But at the same time, the United Nations seems like bring peace only if major powers want it to work. I know you have another book on sustainable development. The human race is facing so many common challenges besides war and peace, including ecological challenges. What can we do so that the attention of the powerful nations can be directed towards solving common challenges rather than trying to finishing each other? 

魏尚进：您在书中提到了格雷厄姆·艾利森关于“修昔底德陷阱”的假说，该假说声称每当权力发生变化时，或者每当两个实力领先的国家在规模上接近时，爆发战争的可能性会远远超过50%。首先，根据您对于历史的研究，您认为“修昔底德陷阱”的假说是对世界各国权力过渡的准确描述吗？其次，联合国的存在是否可以帮助我们摆脱“修昔底德陷阱”？在前六次全球化浪潮中，还没有出现联合国（试图阻止国家之间的战争），而现在我们有了。不过联合国好像只在大国希望它发挥作用时才发挥作用。除了战争与和平之外，人类还面临着许多共同挑战，包括生态挑战。我们要怎么做，才可以协力应对这些挑战，让大国的注意力被更多地引导到解决共同的挑战，而不是试图毁灭彼此？

Yeah. So, one of the most dramatic statements of our reality was made by president John F. Kennedy in 1961 in his inaugural address. And he said when he became president, the world is very different now for mankind has the ability to end all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life. And what he meant was that on the one hand, we're so technologically sophisticated that if we choose, we could end poverty, which is something that could never have been dreamt of in human history before. Actually, China has ended its poverty now, after having so much poverty 50 years ago. But at the same time, a big difference of our age is we have nuclear weapons and we have so much capacity to destroy not only through the military means, but also through the environmental means. So, we are living in a paradoxical age —great technological possibility to achieve good things, and tremendous risks of disaster. 

杰弗里·萨克斯：是的。约翰·F.肯尼迪总统在1961年的就职演说中就我们的现实做出了最具戏剧性的声明。他说，当他成为总统时，世界与过往已经大不相同，一方面人类有能力终结各种形式的贫困，但另一方面人类也有自我摧毁的能力。他的意思是，一方面我们的技术如此先进，以至于如果我们愿意我们就可以结束贫困，这是人类历史上从未实现过的梦想。实际上，中国在经历了五十年前的严重贫困之后，已经实现脱贫。但同时，我们时代的一个很大不同是我们拥有核武器，其强大的破坏力不仅仅体现在军事上，也体现在环境上。所以我们生活在一个矛盾的时代——伟大的技术能实现美好的东西，也能带来巨大的灾难风险。

And my reading of the last 70 years since 1950 is that we can be close to disaster many times during the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union. That was an ideological competition, a competition of systems, and a competition of politics. But it also led to a nuclear arms race. And on several occasions, it led to a confrontation that could easily have become a nuclear war. In fact, there's one famous moment in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, when it was only a vote of two to one within a Soviet submarine not to launch a nuclear attack on the United States, which would have led to a global war.

我对于20世纪50年代以来大约70年的解释是：在美苏冷战期间，我们许多次接近灾难的边缘。这是一个意识形态、制度和政治上的竞争，但它也是一场核军备竞赛。有好几次，核战争差点发生。1962年“古巴导弹危机”中有一个著名的时刻，当时一艘苏联潜艇差一点就对美国发动核攻击，这原本会导致一场世界大战。

And my reading of the last 70 years since 1950 is that we can be close to disaster many times during the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union. That was an ideological competition, a competition of systems, and a competition of politics. But it also led to a nuclear arms race. And on several occasions, it led to a confrontation that could easily have become a nuclear war. In fact, there's one famous moment in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, when it was only a vote of two to one within a Soviet submarine not to launch a nuclear attack on the United States, which would have led to a global war.

我对于二十世纪50年代以来大约70年的解释是：在美苏冷战期间，我们许多次接近灾难的边缘。这是一个意识形态、制度和政治上的竞争，但它也是一场核军备竞赛。有好几次，核战争差点发生。1962年“古巴导弹危机”中有一个著名的时刻，当时一艘苏联潜艇差一点就对美国发动核攻击，这原本会导致一场世界大战。

There were so many wars in history and very bloody ones. But they weren't able to destroy everything because they didn't have nuclear weapons. Now we're capable of destroying everything in a matter of hours. And gradually look at the destruction that can come from environmental change and look at how fast the crisis can arise from a new disease. So, all of these are reasons why we should be cooperating.

历史上有这么多血腥的战争，但因为没有核武器，它们不曾摧毁一切。而今我们却有能力在短短数小时内让一切化为灰烬。我们也能慢慢察觉到环境变化带来的破坏，见证新型疾病转化为危机的速度有多快。这些都解释了我们为什么应该选择合作。

公共政策的实现需要社会凝聚力

S: You are also a deep thinker about public health and epidemiological topics. Countries like Brazil, which until last year was richer than China in terms of capita GDP, can be so ineffective in controlling the pandemic. Why is that?

魏尚进：您也是公共卫生和流行病问题的深刻思考者。能否请您谈一下，为何类似巴西这样去年人均GDP超过中国的国家，在控制新冠肺炎疫情方面竟然如此不力，这是为什么呢？

J: What we're observing actually is a mix of politics and social cohesion. In China, when the Wuhan outbreak occurred, the government acted very decisively, even during the Chinese New Year to lock down the country, at a time when millions and millions of people are in travel. And it was very inconvenient. But it was a necessary move. It was a shocking move. We've never seen it before in history. But the Chinese leadership took a very decisive action. The public abided by the instructions, the applications like Alibaba and other online applications were quickly brought to use. So the digital technologies could be used. Thousands of public health teams were engaged to test people and to isolate people who were infected. All the steps that were taken contributed to suppressing the epidemic. It was really a remarkable achievement because it was out of control at the beginning. But within about seven weeks, it was brought back under control.

杰弗里·萨克斯：我们实际上观察到的是一种政治因素和社会凝聚力交织的影响。在中国，当疫情在武汉爆发时，政府采取了非常果断的“封城”行动，尽管是在中国新年期间，数以百万的人仍在途中。这虽然带来极大地不便，但却是必要的行动。这是一个史无前例、令人震惊的行动。中国领导层采取了非常果断的行动，公众也遵守政府的指示。阿里巴巴集团和其他在线应用程序迅速投入使用。成千上万的公共卫生团队参与了对公众的核酸检测和隔离。所有举措都有助于抑制疫情。这真的是一个了不起的成就。因为疫情虽在初期一度失控，但在大约7周时间内就被控制住了。

Other countries and regions in the Asia-Pacific knew this was urgent. So, one saw in many places a quite sharp response. Republic of Korea was another example where the response was very good. And in Taiwan and Hong Kong region, both have strong public health response. Vietnam did an amazing job, even at very low income. But what I would say in all of these cases is that there was a social responsibility. People wore face masks. They understood this was very dangerous. Government acted decisively at the top and good public health measures were implemented and where possible, the digital technologies were used.

其他亚太国家和地区也清楚抗击新冠肺炎疫情的紧迫性，所以我们看到在许多地方有相当迅速的反应。韩国的反应也是另外一个非常好的例子。在中国台湾和中国香港地区也都有快速的公共卫生响应。尽管越南是一个低收入国家，抗击疫情也表现得很好。但我想说的是，所有这些情况之下，都包含着一种社会责任。人们佩戴口罩，知道疫情的危险性。政府高层果断地采取了行动，执行了良好的公共卫生措施，并在可能的情况下采用了数字技术。

In my country, in the United States and another country which we're speaking about, in Brazil, society is very divided. So, there's a lot of distrust. And instead of having public health control, we had a major cultural and social and political battle. Also people were very divided economically, racially and ideologically. So, in the United States and in Brazil, there was never an attempt made by the national government, neither by president Trump nor by president Bolsonaro of Brazil for a full national-scale policy. In fact, Trump opposed face masks for a long time and wouldn't wear one. On his own, it signaled to his supporters don't wear face masks and governors of states of Trump's party rejected control measures.

在美国和巴西，社会分裂比较严重，信任机制薄弱。两国都没有在关键时刻进行公共卫生方面的控制，取而代之的是一场重大的文化、社会和政治争斗；在经济、种族问题和意识形态上的分裂也十分严重。所以在美国和巴西都未曾有国家政府层面的政策尝试，无论是来自美国总统特朗普还是巴西总统博索纳罗。事实上，特朗普有很长一段时间反对佩戴口罩，自己也不戴口罩。他的做法就是在示意他的支持者不要戴口罩。支持特朗普所在的共和党的州长们也拒绝采取控制疫情的措施。

So, in the end, the United States failed to control this pandemic. And while China has had a few thousand deaths, the United States has had more than 150,000 deaths, even though we're less than 1/4 the population of China. And China has a few cases now each day. But in the United States, we have 60, 000 new cases each day. So, I blame our culture. I blame our politicians. I blame our failure of public response. And basically, I blame our inequality and inability to behave as a society with decency, even with mutual respect, because wearing a face mask is also a respect for other people. I think in Asia, there's a lot of respect that you don't want to infect other people.

所以美国最终未能控制住这场大流行。当中国只有几千人死亡，美国有超过15万人死亡，尽管我们的人口只有不到中国人口的四分之一，并且现在的中国每天新增病例非常少。在美国我们每天有大约6万个新增病例，所以我将应对不力归咎于我们的文化、我们的政客和我们公共响应的失败。在根本上，我将其归咎于我们的不平等和不能像一个良好社会那样的作为。我们甚至没有相互尊重，因为戴口罩也是对其他人的尊重。在亚洲人们非常尊重戴口罩防止感染他人的行为。

全球化没有失败

S: Another question on pandemic has to do with its relationship with globalization. In particular, with Covid-19 pandemic, there's a greater need for international cooperation in terms of delivery of various equipment, protective gears, in terms of exchange of information, and in terms of pulling resources, developing vaccines and cures. At the same time, we hear a lot of rhetoric about decoupling, deglobalization, or moving production away from all offshore areas to home. Given the so much news about decoupling and deglobalization, do you think whether this is a trend, or it is only a temporary phenomenon? Can we ever get back to closer cooperation after that?

魏尚进：另一个关于流行病的问题是它与全球化的关系。在应对新冠肺炎疫情之时，国与国之间非常需要在提供各种设备和防护用品、信息交流、资源整合、疫苗和治疗药物开发等方面进行合作。但同时我们听到了很多关于脱钩、去全球化、将生产从所有的离岸地区转移到国内的噪声。鉴于如此多的关于脱钩和去全球化的新闻，您觉得这是否是一种趋势，是真正的主导思想，还只是暂时的现象？在这之后我们还能回到更紧密的合作状况吗？

J: First, we can ask, what should we desire? And my feeling is that the gains from globalization properly managed are enormous. So, the benefits of globally open world where we are in trade, in tourism, with exchange of students, and in cultural, sports, scientific exchange or entertainment exchange is huge. And I think that it would be a tragedy to lose much of that which is feasible because we have had reversals of globalization in the past. There are deep positive reasons for global interconnectedness, but they can be reversed by policy or by war or by other kinds of disasters and the most famous of these relates to the great depression when countries chose to stop trading with each other and to impose a very, very high tariff starting with the United States in the early 1930s and that led to a collapse of globalization, which was devastating because that in turn led to war. And when globalization fails, distrust among countries rises.

杰弗里·萨克斯：首先，试问我们在渴望什么？我认为我们从管理良好的全球化获得的收益是巨大的。在一个开放的世界中，我们从贸易、旅游、学生交换，从文化、体育、科学和娱乐交流中的获益是巨大的。我认为失去这些原本可以获得的收益将是一个悲剧。过去发生过的全球化逆转给了我们这样的教训。全球互联互通有深刻且积极的意义，但它可以被政策、战争或其他类型的灾难所逆转。其中最著名的是在大萧条时期，国家间选择停止相互贸易，并在20世纪30年代初施加了一个非常高的、始于美国的关税，导致了全球化的崩溃。这是毁灭性的，因为这反过来会导致战争——当全球化失败，国家之间的不信任感就会上升。

So, from the point of view of what we should do, we should not abandon globalization. We should understand that interconnectedness has dangerous, such as the rapid spread of a virus, but we should cooperate to control the bad side of globalization and not lose the beneficial side of globalization. In fact, there will be, I think some of those measures of creating more domestic industry, there will be more competition among key supply chains. There will not be the same positive view of globalization for some years to come. But if we're lucky, we won't have a collapse. We will just have a moderation or some adjustment. A lot depends on, unfortunately, US politics.

所以就我们应该做什么而言，答案是不应该放弃全球化。我们应该理解互联互通有危险，比如病毒的快速传播；但我们应该通过合作来管控全球化不好的一面，而不要放弃全球化有益的一面。有一些举措会保护国内的（关键）产业，也会带来更多关键供应链之间的竞争。在未来几年内，人们不再对全球化有同过去一样的完全积极的看法，但如果我们幸运的话，全球化体系不会瓦解，而只会有一个适度的调整。不幸的是，（具体发展的格局）很大程度上取决于美国的政治。

I think it's vital if and when we have a new president, China and the US may deepen the discussions. There’ll be even much deeper institutional cooperation and exchanges on many issues — energy, environment, public health, economics, finance, technology, etc. Because I think that having a deep relationship where you really negotiate these issues and work them out in a lot of professional detail would stabilize this situation and enable globalization to continue on all its positive dimensions.

如果我们换了一位新总统，中国和美国将（可以）讨论更深层次的、制度上的合作，在许多问题上进行交流：能源、环境、公共卫生、经济、金融、技术等。因为我认为有了深厚的关系，双方才能真正谈判这些问题，并在很多专业细节上解决它们。这样才能稳定这种局面，使全球化积极地进行下去。

S: One claim by some in the US is that WTO has failed in multiple fronts, including in converting China to be one that follows international trading rules, and therefore the United States has not been benefiting from trade. I wonder whether you can share your analysis of this view? How can the WTO reform itself and help to revive the world trade, and help the world economy to recover soon from the Covid recession? 

魏尚进：在美国有一种说法认为世贸组织已经在多个方面（包括敦促中国遵循国际贸易体系等）失败了，因此美国一直吃亏，也并没有从贸易中受益。请问您是否赞同这个观点？世贸组织体系如何可以通过改革再次帮助振兴世界贸易，帮助世界经济从疫情带来的经济萧条中尽快复苏？

J: Yeah, it's a very interesting and intricate question. First, WTO did not fail, and the globalization of trade did not fail. It's been a very positive outcome overall. It has been key for China's development. And I think it has been beneficial for the United States and for other parts of the world as well. And the rules of the game of WTO have been very helpful for that.

杰弗里·萨克斯：是的，这是一个非常有趣而复杂的问题。首先，世贸组织并没有失败，贸易全球化也没有失败。总体而言，这是一个非常积极的结果，它一直是中国发展的关键。我认为这对美国和世界其他地区也是有益的。世贸组织的游戏规则对各国发展都是非常有帮助的。

Now, there are several issues that have arisen that we should be clear about. One is that US-China trade probably worsened the income distribution in the United States because some industrial workers lost their jobs. China was very competitive in many industrial sectors, especially in manufacturing sectors. And it's quite possible that the international trade raised the US income, but also worsened the US income distribution. But that's not a fault of China or fault of WTO because when we teach international trade, what we teach is that international trade enables overall rise of income, but it can shift the distribution. So, in order to ensure that everybody benefits, there needs to be redistributive policies together with trade in the United States. We don't have those kinds of redistributive policies. So, losers lose, winners win, and losers become unhappy and vote for opponents of trade. But what we should have is more redistribution inside the United States.

现在有几个问题我们应该明确。一个是中美贸易很有可能确实恶化了美国的收入分配体系，使一些美国的产业工人失去了工作。因为中国在很多产业部门都非常有竞争力，特别是制造业部门。国际贸易提高了美国的总体收入，同时也影响了美国的收入分配。但这不是中国的错，也不是世贸组织的错，因为当我们讲授国际贸易时，我们讲的是国际贸易使收入整体上升，但它可以改变分配。所以为了确保每个人都能受益，美国需要有再分配政策配合贸易，而我们没有这种再分配的政策。所以输家输了，赢家赢了。输家变得不高兴，投票给贸易的反对者。但我们应该做的是在美国内部进行更多的再分配。

And China's answer to the US is, look, you have benefited with the larger economy, and we have benefited with the larger economy. If some people have been left behind, that is what our national policies should help to address with retraining, reskilling, new jobs, new industries development and so forth. This is why in social democratic countries, for example, in Germany or in Northern European countries like Sweden and Denmark, there isn't a backlash. The same way as there is in the US, because there's a lot of redistribution of income, a lot more job training and a lot more sharing of the benefits. So, the WTO didn't fail, but American politics failed to make sure that the benefits were shared adequately.

中国对美国的回应是，既然美国和中国都已经从（双边贸易中）受益，如果有些人被落下了，那需要本国政府采取政策通过再培训、新技能培养，提供新的就业机会，发展新的产业等来帮助解决问题。这就是为什么在社会民主国家，如德国或瑞典和丹麦等北欧国家，没有出现类似美国强烈的全球化逆潮，因为它们有很多的收入再分配措施、更多的工作培训、更多的利益分享。所以，世贸组织没有失败，但美国政治没有确保充分的利益共享。

Then I think there's a second very important dimension that we're facing right now. China has engaged in very extensive industrial policies to promote new industries and the “Made in China 2025” policies identify 10 priority areas, such as advanced semi-conductors, advanced transport, a precision agriculture, advanced medicine and so forth. This is a very smart policy, in my view, because China strategically has identified priority technologies and has said we're going to drive technological advancement in those areas. Now the United States also has industrial policies, but we don't usually think of them that way. So, if the US advance the Internet or develops a genome sequencing, that's with the government. And then it's turned over to the private sector, but we don't count that as industrial policy.

我认为，我们现在还正面临着第二个非常重要的方面，就是中国已经广泛地制定了颇有远见的产业政策来促进新兴产业发展。“中国制造2025”政策确定了十个优先发展的领域，比如先进半导体、先进运输、精准农业、先进医学等。在我看来这是一个非常明智的政策，因为中国在战略上已经确定了优先领域，并表示将在这些领域推动技术进步。现在美国也有产业政策，但我们通常不会像中国一样去考虑这些问题。所以如果美国推进互联网发展或开发基因组测序，这些都是政府行为，然后移交到私营部门，但美国不把它称为产业政策。

So, it's partly an ideological view that what China does is industrial policy and unfair and what we do is scientific progress and only fair. So, there's an issue of semantics. But there's another substantive issue, in my opinion, which is that because we are in a technological dynamic period.

因此，（美国）认为中国所做的产业政策是不公平的，而（自认为）美国所做的才是代表科学进步和公平的，在一定程度上是一种意识形态的观点。这里其实只是一个表达的问题。但在我看来还有一个实质性问题是，我们处于一个技术动态发展的阶段。

It's a good idea to have industrial policies where government helps to promote be underlying science and early stage technological advancement, whether it's in renewable energy, artificial intelligence, advanced robotics, and so forth, or environmental conservation. So, for this reason, I'm in favor of industrial policy.

我认为制定产业政策是一个好主意，政府帮助促进基础科学和早期阶段的技术进步，不管是在可再生能源领域，还是在人工智能、先进机器人技术等领域，抑或是在环境保护领域等。因此，出于这个原因，我赞成产业政策。

Now WTO does not have good rules about this. There isn't clarity about how to interact. So the United States points its finger to China and says that's unfair. This should be done not through a trade war or through a technology war. It should be done through negotiations and it should be done at least with three (or) even more partners. But China is one. The European Union is another. The United States is the third. Of course, there are many other countries that say we're part of this too, Republic of Korea, Japan, and so on. So, finding the right venue for a serious negotiation over how to keep industrial policy for its beneficial side and not for its beggar-thy-neighbor, damaging side when it damages others. Industrial policies are important and their beneficial, I think for everybody, not just for China. The United States and Europe should have industrial policies. But we should negotiate a framework for them that makes them more transparent and focuses on the beneficial side of promoting technological advance, not on damaging the other country.

现在世贸组织对此没有很好的规定，没有明确如何互动。所以美国把矛头指向中国，说这是不公平的。这不应该通过贸易摩擦或技术战来完成，而应该通过谈判来完成，并至少应该与三个甚至更多的伙伴一起来完成。中国是其中一方，欧盟是另一方，美国是第三方。当然，还有很多其他国家表示它们也是其中的一部分，比如韩国和日本。所以找到合适的地点进行认真的谈判，讨论如何保持产业政策有利的一面，而不是以邻为壑、有损相互利益的方面。产业政策不但重要而且对每个国家都是有益的。美国和欧洲都应该有产业政策，但我们应该为此谈判一个框架，使其更为透明，并侧重于促进有益的技术进步，而不是损害其他国家。

遏制数字军备竞赛

S: Let me add three comments to what you said. So, number one, the World Trade Organization was set up under the leadership of the United States. Its rules reflect much of what US thinks, and importantly China has played no role in writing the WTO rules since China at the time was not a member economy.

魏尚进：请允许我补充三个评论。第一，世界贸易组织是在美国的领导下成立的，其规则生效很大程度上体现的是美国的想法。中国实际上没有参与其规则制定，因为中国不是 WTO 创始成员国。

Secondly, the concept of industrial policy was not invented by China. In fact, it was invented by United States — Alexander Hamilton, the first US Secretary of Treasury, a founding father of the nation and a graduate of Columbia university, or its predecessor, the King's College. So, certainly the idea of industrial policy was not foreign to US.

第二，产业政策的概念不是中国发明的，事实上它是美国的第一任财政部长、开国元勋，毕业于哥伦比亚大学的前身国王学院的亚历山大·汉密尔顿发明的。所以对美国而言，产业政策并不陌生。

But there are different views. Some say US has never adopted industrial policy. It's a bad idea from Hamilton. Others say “No, we don't like the phrase of industrial policy, but we practice it all the time throughout our history from our science, technology program, NIH, NSF, Department Defense budget, or Department Energy budget. We do a lot of things those are functionally the same as industrial policy, but we hate that term for some reason”. I'm curious about your view on this.

但不同的美国人有不同的观点。有些人说美国从来没有采取过产业政策，这是一个汉密尔顿想出来的馊主意。也有些人说，虽然我们不喜欢“产业政策”这个词，但实际上我们在历史上一直在施行它——从政府对科学技术项目的支持包括美国国立卫生研究院（NIH）、美国国家科学基金会（NSF）到国防部预算和能源部预算，我们做了很多实质上和产业政策等同的事情，但我们出于某些原因讨厌这个词。所以我很好奇您对这两个说法有什么看法？

The 3rd comment is the relationship between WTO and industrial policy. A key principle of WTO is non-discrimination between domestic firms and foreign firms. This means industrial policy in principle can be structured in such a way that's consistent with non-discrimination, and therefore compatible with WTO rules, right?

第三是，世贸组织和产业政策之间的关系。世贸组织的一个关键原则是对国内外企业一视同仁，不以企业的国别为基础进行歧视。至少从逻辑上说产业政策可以做到符合非歧视原则，与WTO规则一致。您是否同意？

To the extent, the industrial policy is meant to address some “externality” in technological advancement in which maybe private sector on their own may not put in enough resources. One could imagine a case in which international collaboration, collectively supporting certain industry, is a socially beneficial policy, and vaccine development during the pandemics an example of this. If we think the private sector on its own might not put in enough resources, national governments can step in and step up the effort. It will be even more efficient for the world as whole to do it, if there's some resource pooling arrangements. Do you think we should have a global version of the industrial policy in some areas that could advance the interest of humankind?

有些经济活动或技术发展因为存在“外部性”，私营部门自身可能不会投入足够的资源。这时产业政策可能有用武之地。我们甚至可以想象这样一种情况，实施跨国性的产业政策，通过国际合作共同支持某些产业，如新冠肺炎疫情背景下的疫苗开发，仅靠私营部门可能不会投入足够的资源，但政府可以介入并加紧努力。如果有一个国际性的产业政策，进行一些资源共享，全世界作为一个整体会更有效率。您认为我们是否应该在某些领域制定一个促进人类利益的全球版本的产业政策？

J: These are really deep and great observations that you're making. Let me go back to Alexander Hamilton for one moment. Industrial policy has two parts, I think in history. One is catching up. And the other is general advancement.

杰弗里·萨克斯：您的观察很好，非常深刻！让我先回到亚历山大·汉密尔顿有关产业政策的研究。我认为在历史上，产业政策有两类目标：一个是迎头赶上其他国家；另一个是一般性的发展进步。

So, when Alexander Hamilton was writing about industrial policy, he was aware that England was technologically ahead of the United States. And as the first the Treasury Secretary of the United States, he was concerned, how can we catch up as a new industrializing economy, which United States was at the time. So he helped to give ideas about that catching up. And there were also good business people taking whatever technology they could find from England and bringing it over to the United States and trying to implement the same measures in the US. So, that's part of the catching up.

所以当亚历山大·汉密尔顿在写作时，他意识到英国在技术上领先于美国。作为美国的第一任财政部长，他非常重视作为新型工业化经济体的美国如何赶上英国。所以从这个意义上讲，是他帮助给出了关于追赶的想法。我们也有企业家把从英国找到的技术都带到美国，并试图在美国复制（英国的）技术。所以，这是追赶的一部分。

Then there's the more general question of industrial policy for advancement of knowledge and surely all major powers have industrial policies, first for the military. This is where so much industrial policy in history has taken place. But the United States was very clever after World War Two. Again, we really had a great president Franklin Roosevelt, who in 1944, said to his science advisor, “What do we do with all of these military technologies that we've advanced during World War Two, radar, semi-conductors, computation, and so on. How do we make this available for the civilian economy? This was a great idea because Roosevelt did not want just a military superpower. He wanted a good society. So, the outcome of that was a famous book in American economic thinking or national strategy called “Science, the Endless Frontier”, written in 1945 by Vannevar Bush, who was Franklin Roosevelt’s science advisor. And it said, let us champion science-based economic development. And out of that came the institutions you mentioned the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health and very large spending by the US government on technological advancement.

然后更普遍的问题是支持知识进步的产业政策。当然所有的主要大国都有产业政策，首先是用在军事上——这是历史上这么多产业政策的起点。但美国在第二次世界大战结束后非常聪明。再说一次，我们真的曾有一个伟大的总统富兰克林·罗斯福。他在1944年对他的科学顾问说，我们该怎么用好在第二次世界大战期间发展起来的所有军事技术——雷达、半导体、计算机等；如何为民用经济提供这些技术。这是一个伟大的想法，因为罗斯福不希望美国只是一个军事超级大国，他想要营造一个良好的社会。其成果是一本有关美国经济思想或国家战略的著作《科学：无尽的前沿》，由富兰克林的科学顾问万尼瓦尔·布什作于1945年。书中提到，让我们捍卫以科学为基础的经济发展。由此，您之前提到的美国国家科学基金会、美国国立卫生研究院等机构成立，美国政府在技术进步方面进行巨大投入。

There was a huge payoff from this, because this is where the Internet eventually arose from. This is where the semi-conductor industry eventually arose from. This is where the “Moon Shot” gave us space technology, satellite technology, GPS, a huge advance in Micro-electronics and so many other areas. So, that's all sophisticated industrial policy, but just not called that. And the United States had huge, huge benefits that I think our global benefits.

这些都给我们带来了巨大的回报，因为这是互联网和半导体行业最终出现的起点，是登月发射技术的前身，带给了我们空间技术、卫星技术、全球定位系统，以及在微电子和许多其他领域的巨大进步。这些都是复杂的产业政策，只是没有被这样称呼。美国获得了巨大的利益，我认为这些还造福了全球。

So, your idea, for example, of putting the principles of this non-discrimination or global pooling is a great starting point. For example, to decarbonize the world energy system as fast as possible or to bring Internet access to everybody to end poverty. These are global public goods that we should pursue together. Then there will also necessarily be competition. We should restrain the digital arms race in weaponry just like we have tried to do with nuclear arms. We don't want arms race in cyber warfare. That would be awful and could be very disruptive. But we do want some competition in other areas — who's going to produce the best electric vehicles. We should have some rules of the game, some rules of the road so that one can have industrial policies but still have global competition, have trade and not have the massive distortions that are going to lead to a loss of wellbeing for all of us. And so, I think you should write down these principles that you started too. And this becomes the basis for our new multilateral negotiations.

实际上您提出的无歧视原则或全球资源整合是一个很好的起点。例如，加快世界能源系统的碳减排，或使英特网触及每一个人以帮助结束贫困，这些是我们应该共同追求的全球公共产品。当然国与国之间也必然会有竞争。但我们应该遏制数字军备竞赛，就像我们在核武器方面所做的那样。我们不想要太空军备竞赛，否则这将是可怕的并非常具有破坏性的。同时我们确实希望在其他领域有一些竞争，如竞争谁能生产出更好的电动汽车。我们应该有一些游戏规则、一些道路规则，这样我们就可以既有产业政策，也有全球竞争、有国际贸易，而不是以大规模的扭曲损害全球人类的福祉。所以您应该把您的想法写下来，把这些原则写下来，这可以成为国与国之间新的多边谈判的基础。

*本文仅代表访谈者个人观点，翻译：吴畏，编辑：潘琦。